Category Archives: IPCC

The increasing confidence seems to be very hard to explain

The UK parliamentary Inquiry of Energy and Climate Change Committee into “the science” of UNIPCC AR5 was a very interesting event. This in several ways. There was of course the fact that this time there was a alarmist panel and a skeptic panel that were questioned. On blogs and articles I heard a lot about the second session, the one with the skeptics. But I was more interested in the first session. It gave me a lot of ideas, so probably some later posts about things that caught my eye.

In previous post I spend some time on the question why there is now increased confidence in human influences and the answers were puzzling.

Why was I so interested in that little question? Earlier, I was confused by the statement of the IPCC that they had more confidence that humans caused the warming in the last 60 years. In the media I could not find a clarification about this, only a rehash of the statement. Now, in this UK parliamentary Inquiry, I came across an insider that seems to give some more background information. That insight could indeed fit the IPCC statement, but when looking into it, it also made it meaningless.

To recapitulate: the statement was that we can have more confidence that the human influence is towards warming because the higher confidence that the cooling influence is less than previously thought. Meaning the overall anthropogenic influence is warming. As I said before I can agree with that, but it doesn’t say nothing about the amount of anthropogenic warming. It could be more, true, but it could also be less or even the same.

This is what puzzled me: the inquiry was set up in order to inform policy makers about the science in the IPCC AR5 report. The answer given was to an interesting scientific problem, but was not aligned to MP’s, at least not without additional explanations. Policy makers don’t want to know that net anthropogenic influence is towards warming, they probably start from there already. What they want to know is how much that influence is.

Further in the inquiry there was another attempt to pose the exact same question. According to the transcript:

[Graham Stringer]
Going back to some of the questions that John asked previously, one of the things that puzzles me about the greater confidence that the IPCC now has in their analysis and predictions is the hiatus in increasing temperature was not predicted, and yet you have greater confidence as that particular prediction was wrong. I am a chemist, not a mathematician and so I am treading somewhere where I fear to tread, but my understanding of Bayesian analysis is that when you have high confidence of something and you miss your target, you should have less confidence, not more confidence. Why do you have more confidence?

[Professor Sir Brian Hoskins]
I was not part of it, so I will not say “we”, but let me say that the models were not in the position to predict the hiatus, because that would have been an initial value problem where they would have needed the observations over the whole depth of the ocean as well as more of the whole climate system to start the model off, like a weather forecast if you like. That information was not available and so they were just running and would not expect to predict that behaviour. There is no way that counters the model. It is the sort of variability one would hope that the long runs of the models would show and I suspect that the models do not quite have enough of that sort of variability in general, which means that climate can change faster in one spell and less fast in another spell. They are probably slightly too uniform in their behaviours. There was no attempt and, in fact, there would have been no ability to predict the hiatus at that time. That was a decadal prediction problem for which the initial data were not available, but perhaps I can hand over to you.

That is a diplomatic answer. “The models were not in the position” and “there would have been no ability to predict the hiatus at that time”, as if they are now. And “suspect that the models do not quite have enough of that sort of variability in general”, wouldn’t be easier to say they still don’t.

[Dr Stott]
Maybe it is just worth pointing out that back in the Second Assessment Report there was a statement when it was talking about warming rates to 2100. The actual annual to decadal changes would include considerable natural variability, and this is part of what we are seeing at the moment and part of what has been assessed. Of course, it has been relatively challenging to assess this, because we are talking about very up-to-date information and therefore, for the cut-off date that the IPCC had, which was 15 March last year, there has not been a huge amount of literature, but that literature was assessed. In fact, the assessment that was made in the Fifth Assessment Report has been borne out by further evidence we have had since.

In the assessment it talks about particularly the contribution from internal variability, including a possible redistribution of heat within the ocean, and we have seen some literature since then-we also discussed this in the series of notes that the Met Office produced as well-that has talked about the potential role of the Pacific decadal oscillation, all within a context where we have seen multiple indicators of climate change, including estimates of the increasing energy of the climate system, continuing to increase in the last 15 years. There is more work to do to further delve into exactly the details of that Pacific decadal oscillation and what that is doing, but there is clearly an implication behind that, which is that there is an expectation for warming rates to pick up in the future as the mode of that variability switches into the other mode.

[Professor Sir Brian Hoskins]
At a meeting in Downing Street in the late 1980s I said that we could easily have a decade that would be cooler than the previous one and that would not mean the whole global warming thing had gone away. It is not unexpected, given natural variability, to get a behaviour like this but there was no attempt to predict it.

Basically it is said to be natural variability. But that was not the question. Even when we believe that it is natural variability, doesn’t that add to less confidence if it is not understood? What does the standstill actually mean in terms of their understanding? They avoided talking about the standstill in global temperatures. They just assumed it was a natural process that can’t be ruled out. I agree that a period of non-warming can’t be ruled out in a warming world, but what does this mean for the theory? It was brought into the discussion by Peter Lilley and also by Robert Smith, but all the alarmists witnesses kept well away from answering the question.

To me this is the big question: if human influence on cooling is less and the total anthropogenic effect is towards warming and there is a standstill in temperatures while there is “unprecedented” amounts of CO2 spewed in the atmosphere and that CO2 being the main cause of global warming, what does this tells us about the theory? That there are unexplained forcings/feedbacks that are not taken into account yet. What if those unknown effects have a big influence on global temperature? To me, just as to Smith, Lilley and Stringer, this looks as there should be less confidence, because some elements in the system are not yet known, not yet quantified and they seem to have quite some influence.

It is a waste of time to debate … we do not have the answers either

When searching for information on how the AR5 was portrayed in the media, I came to this remarkable interview with Jean-Pascale van Ypersele (vice chair of the IPCC) in MO* magazine.

Again the usual statement that “the 5th IPCC report confirms with even more certainty that the warming is persisting and that man is responsible”. No word of course about the lowered equilibrium climate sensitivity, the larger sensitivity range, the inability to give a best estimate, the low confidence in trend and attribution of droughts and hurricanes, the lowered confidence in climate models and so on. Also no mention that this assessment is a opinion, not a measured value. In the light of this it is a bit odd certainty goes from 90% to 95%.

The thing that surprised me was that van Ypersele didn’t hide the fact that politics is almost as important to him than science (his father and grandfather were politicians). Which is probably an advantage having in the IPCC process (the IPCC is a political organization that uses science for its purposes).

That is how I saw the rest of the article, a combination of science and politics. About the AR Summary for Policymakers (translated from Dutch):

For five days long they discussed almost day and night about the Summary for Policymakers. Climate scientists simply do not rush it. And once the evidence is obvious, they also want politicians to take responsibility.

The summary for policymakers is a combination of science and politics. Strangely he says that “once the evidence is obvious”. As if the evidence is that clear. It relies heavily on climate models, which received quite some criticism in the last year. There is a growing discrepancy between the output of models and the observations. That would also be a reason why the certainty should have been lowered in stead of increased.

The reporter suggested that the report was conservative because the numbers are old. The answer (translated from Dutch):

With all the filtering it underwent, it can only be conservative. But the final findings have been accepted by all countries, including Russia and Saudi Arabia. That’s very important, the report is very solid. If we don’t have controversy anymore over this data, it is a very important base. Therefor, the UN Climate Panel decided not to enter into debate with climate skeptics about science anymore. The debate should now be about the solutions.

This strikes me as a pure political statement, not a scientific one. Scientifically, it shouldn’t even matter if a finding is accepted by all countries. The fact that these countries agree, doesn’t mean this is a solid finding, in fact, it only means that the selected members of those countries agree on this text, not that it is scientifically correct. Big difference.

No controversy anymore? Sure, if there is no debate anymore with skeptics about the science, then there obviously is no controversy anymore and the debate could be continued to find the solutions. Which is the pure political part in the process.

This gives it a sense of urgency. Quick, quick, we have to do something. Never mind the failing models, never mind the observations that raise questions that could not even be answered, the lowered sensitivity,…

Besides, losing the debate because of the naughty uncertainty could mean losing credibility.

Acting upon the advice of the UN Climate Panel he refused a debate (translated from Dutch)

That’s why I did not accept the invitation of the RTBF program Mise au Point to debate with fellow chemist at UCL, István Markó. It is a waste of time to debate someone like that before a public that does not think about it in a scientific way. I don’t avoid the debate on scientific questions, but then it must be conducted in a scientific context, in meetings with scientists. If you have a science that is so firmly established, examined by hundreds of scientists, and if the result is accepted by all governments of the world, no, I have no more time to this yet to deal with a climate non-expert who cast doubt in the debate.

That really convenient. Back in 2011 he once debated István Markó and it didn’t fare well. After the discussion the majority of the audience said not believing that humans are responsible for global warming, while at the beginning it was the reverse.

He doesn’t want to discuss about it anymore, except with like minded people. That’s not a debate anymore, but a cozy get-together. It gives me the impression that here speaks a man that doesn’t want to prove his case and just want to press his political ideas without resistance. This is not a scientist speaking, but a politician.

Low confidence in trend and attribution of droughts and hurricanes, doh!

In climate change communication droughts and hurricanes are two constants. We hear there is an increase in droughts, of course due to global warming. Also, more hurricanes are the fingerprint of a warming world. It looks strange because nor droughts nor hurricanes are on the increase, but it has been told so many time that a lot of people believe it.

Therefor it was a surprise to see the extreme weather table in SPM AR5 (table SPM.1 on page 23) and even more when comparing it with the similar table in SPM AR4 (table SPM.2 on page 8).

This is the comparison table:

  Likelihood of future trends
Phenomenon and direction of trend Likelihood that trend occurred in late 20th century (typically post-1960) Likelihood of a human contribution to observed trend Early 21st century Late 21st century
  AR4 → AR5 AR4 → AR5 AR4 → AR5 AR4 → AR5
Area affected by droughts increases Likely in many regions since 1970 → Low confidence on global scale/Likely changes in some regions More likely than not → Low confidence Likely → Low confidence Likely → Likely (medium confidence ) on a regional to global scale
Intense tropical cyclone activity increases Likely in many regions since 1970 → Low confidence in long term (centennial) changes. Virtually certain in North Atlantic since 1970 More likely than not → Low confidence Likely → Low confidence Likely → More likely than not in the Western North Pacific and North Atlantic
Droughts

Likelihood of the trend occurred since late 20th century went from “likely in many regions since 1970” to “Low confidence on global scale/likely changes in some regions”. Rather odd that they had to adjust their assessment for a trend that supposedly was there, “clear” to see. Some areas were likely to change, but globally there is not much confidence.

The same with human attribution: this went from “More likely” in AR4 to “Low confidence” in AR5. Nice to hear.

Likelihood of future trend went from “Likely” to “Low confidence” in the early 21th century and “Likely” on a regional to global scale. After hearing so many horror stories about droughts this seems serious backpedaling.

Tropical cyclone activity

Like droughts the trend occurred since the late 20th century went from “likely in many regions since 1970” to “Low confidence on a global scale”, but “Virtually certain in North Atlantic”.

The likelihood of human attribution went from “More likely than not” in AR4 to “Low confidence” in AR5.

Also the future likelihood short term went from “Likely” to “Low confidence” and on long term the confidence is assigned to “More likely than not”. Not that much confidence anymore.

Well, low confidence of human attribution and short term increases in droughts and hurricanes. That’s good news! Until now we were bombarded with loads of doom stories. Now those seems to to be based on nothing much. Pity this was not in the press release. Wouldn’t it be great when the public got to know such things? 😉

95% certainty or 95% opinion?

On September 27, 2013 the IPCC declared that the “human influence on the climate system is clear” in the AR5 Summary for Policymakers. In the current report they declared more than 95% certainty (extremely likely) that greenhouse gases account for more than half of the increased global average surface temperatures, while they declared only 90% (very likely) for something similar in the previous report.

For us, the great unwashed, this seems really impressive. We assume it is a accurate picture of reality and the science made quite some progress in the last six years and hey, 95% certainty isn’t that more than enough for action?

It made me wonder what this “certainty” exactly means and how it is determined. This is what the AR Summary for Policymakers says about it (page 2):

The degree of certainty in key findings in this assessment is based on the author teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain).

That seems more like the subjective interpretation of a certain group of scientists (that probably are selected for having these opinions in the first place).

But look at reality. The “pause” was not foreseen and unexplained. We were told many times (also in this report) that human produced CO2 drives temperatures. If this really is the case then a more than a decade long standstill in temperature increase, together with a record amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, must tell us something: there is at least one forcing or feedback with at least the (combined) strength of CO2 that is not accounted for.

That alone should have humbled the scientists and adjust their certainty DOWNwards in stead of upwards. Self declaring more certainty in the face of a glaring gap in their understanding of the climate system doesn’t make much sense.

95% certainty or 90% certainty, what does it even matter? It is both as impossible to evaluate anyway.

Climate sensitivity? What climate sensitivity?

After looking at the attribution certainty differences between AR4 and AR5, this time the differences of the equilibrium climate sensitivity. This is how AR5 defines it:

The equilibrium climate sensitivity quantifies the response of the climate system to constant radiative forcing on multi-century time scales. It is defined as the change in global mean surface temperature at equilibrium that is caused by a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration.

Basically, the warming we would expect for a doubling of CO2, in most cases determined as doubling of pre-industrial concentration of 280 ppm to 560 ppm (when we continue emissions like this, we will maybe get there, dependent on how much fossil fuels stay available). This is how they were assessed in both reports:

AR4 (SPM p. 12)
Progress since the TAR enables an assessment that climate sensitivity is likely to be in the range of 2 to 4.5°C with a best estimate of about 3°C, and is very unlikely to be less than 1.5°C. Values substantially higher than 4.5°C cannot be excluded, but agreement of models with observations is not as good for those values.

AR5 (SPM p. 11)
Equilibrium climate sensitivity is likely in the range 1.5°C to 4.5°C (high confidence), extremely unlikely less than 1°C (high confidence), and very unlikely greater than 6°C (medium confidence).

That’s a step back in sensitivity and no mention anymore of the best estimate (3 °C in AR4). Maybe it is still too high. The pause tells us that something doesn’t add up: the climate sensitivity could be even smaller than presented and/or there are other forces or feedbacks that are not represented in the models. Therefor the big surprise about the declaration of “even more certainty” in AR5, despite the known discrepancy between the observations and the outcome of the climate models.

It is strange that the certainty range is getting larger. The lower limit is 1.5 °C, but the higher limit stays at 4.5 °C and a best estimate can not be given anymore. Really? After 6 years the settled science is even less clear about sensitivity?

Nevertheless, if climate sensitivity could be lower than expected, then less warming could be expected. That’s good news. But no mention of the lowered limit in the press release. To be fair, it is mentioned in the Summary for the Policymakers, also that it is lower than the value in AR4, but because the media doesn’t read the Summary report, it is not communicated to the public. It almost didn’t get in the Summary report. According to the minutes of the IPCC plenary session:

Quantification of Climate System Responses: On equilibrium climate sensitivity, several delegations, including Australia, the Netherlands and others, noted that the message that the lower limit of the assessed “likely” range of climate sensitivity is less than the 2°C in the AR4 can be confusing to policy makers and suggested noting it is the same as in previous assessments. The CLAs explained that comparison to each of the previous IPCC assessments would be difficult, and new language was developed adding that the upper limit of the assessed range is the same as in AR4.

Some representatives in the plenary session found the lower sensitivity to be “confusing” and suggested to note it is the same as previous assessment (it is not). I can imagine vividly why this lower value would be confusing for policymakers.

Finally, when looking at how this lower sensitivity limit is communicated to the public…Nothing…Nada…Niente… only skeptical sites/blogs seem to report on it.

Attribution certainty differences between AR4 and AR5

One of the conclusions from the AR5 Summary for Policymakers is the higher degree of certainty of the human attribution on the average temperature increase since the 1950s. It was said it went from 90% certainty in 2007 to 95% in the current report. Journalists took this on face value and creatively put this in their articles. It makes me wonder if they even have read the summary report. It makes me wonder even more if they read the previous report and took the time to compare the two statements.

So what did the IPCC stated in those two reports?

AR4 (SPM p. 10)
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.

AR5 (SPM p. 12)
It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together.

Indeed we see the word very likely (according to AR4 this is 90%) and extremely likely (according to AR4 this is 95%). But there seems to be several subtle rewordings. It is interesting to see the difference between the two:

  AR4 AR5
Which temperatures Global average temperatures Global average surface temperature
Period of attribution Since the mid-20th century From 1951 to 2010
Cause Due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations Caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together
Attribution Most More than half
Which temperatures
In AR5 they specified global average surface temperature. Does this mean they exclude the satellite record? As far as I know satellites don’t record surface temperatures, only the temperature of the different layers of the atmosphere. Does it mean they only rely for the conclusion of attribution on surface measurement series like Giss or HadCrut?
Period of attribution
This surprised me a bit. Why suddenly use a specific endpoint (2010) when in previous report it was just till the year of the report was created? Maybe they just wanted to have whole decades? But to me it looks a bit strange why they didn’t/couldn’t state this for the last three years. Did something changed in the last 3 years so they couldn’t state this anymore?
The cause
AR4 only talked about anthropogenic greenhouse gases. AR5 includes also other anthropogenic forcings. It would be interesting to read more about that in the final report. For whatever reason the observed is omitted. Is this attribution made by something else than observations/measurements? Maybe partly by models?
Attribution

Both are not sharply defined quantifications. At first glance if you look at them in a pure logical way, they are equivalent. “More than half” is from the first unit of one half (51% or 50,1% or …), so in theory it could span to the last unit before 100 (99% or 99.9% or…). The same with “Most”. It is definitely higher than 50% and definitely smaller than 100%.

What bothers me is this: obviously someone had the bright idea to change the wording. Why change one vaguely defined quantification into another vaguely defined quantification?

If one looks at it from a pure logical standpoint, “More than half” and “Most” are identical. But does everybody looks at it in a logical way? I recognized the discussion. A couple weeks ago I had this discussion about the difference between “Most” and “More than half”. Intuitively I would place “More than half” somewhat above 50% and “Most” more to the end of the spectrum. If I would have to use them both, than “More than half” would be lower than “Most”.

In my search on the difference between the two, I found this was actually a field of study for linguists and psychologists. They study for example how those words are used in our daily language. In On measurement and quantification: The case of most and more than half I found a graph that shows the occurrence of the two terms where also a quantifier is used in Corpus Of Contemporary American English (COCA).

Occurrence of the two terms where also a quantifier was used

Occurrence of “Most” and “More than half” where also a quantifier was used Source: gwz-berlin

It shows that “More than half” is mostly used in cases of 50-60%, and a low occurrence in the range 60-75%. “Most” is used in the full range, but the highest occurrence are in the range of 80-95%. Personally, as a simple member of the public, I would use “More than half” as 50-60% and “Most” as “70-90%”. In that sense, to me it feels like they are more sure about a lower occurrence of human attribution, or put differently: that they are more sure that there is less attribution than previously stated. That looks like a step back, cleverly disguised as a step forward. The press probably didn’t look at the differences in both reports and some of them even gave it a personal interpretation!

I do not know what the IPCC really intended with the changed quantification, but jumping from one vague quantifier to another could well come to haunt them in the long run. This is a report for policymakers, they won’t necessarily look at it in a pure logical way and some of them might want to compare both reports.

There seem to be a lot of subtle changes between the two reports, which doesn’t make it easy to compare both. Maybe even make it impossible. It is not the same period they talk about, not the same temperatures, not the same cause and not the same quantification. This makes them not directly comparable.

Whipping up the AR5 Summary for Policy Makers

Journalism is obviously not an exact science. Journalists are not necessarily scientifically savvy. Yet they are the connection between (climate) science and the public. The understanding of the issue of the public depends on the ability of the media to correctly translates the science. Some journalists solve this by just printing what the scientists put in their mouth, without investigate it further. This is not difficult to understand. Journalists have to work with a deadline and that doesn’t facilitate investigative work on the issue, especially when the work was already done by “experts” in the field.

There are also journalists who put their own twist to their article based on what they know of the story. That doesn’t always fare well. See the ecosystems that were spiraling out of control. The AR5 Summary for Policy Makers release was a high profile subject. That message was bound to getting exaggerated.

In previous post I mentioned already the VRT news of September 27, 2013 about the press release of the AR5 Summary for Policy Makers. Beside the conclusions stated by Thomas Stocker in the press release, the journalist cranked the volume button up. Here are some extracts (Translated from Dutch):

[News anchor]
Our earth continues to heat up faster and faster as a result of greenhouse gas emissions by humans so. That is the conclusion of the five-yearly report by the UN’s about the climate. Because of that warming the polar ice will melt faster. Also, the water level of seas and oceans will rise.

That’s not true. It gives the impression that the temperatures went increasingly up, adding even more speed now. This couldn’t be farther from the truth. There is a pause in temperatures in the last decade/decade and a half, some even say a slight decrease.

I can imagine where the misconception comes from. Somewhat later in the news, there is the IPCC co chair that said the following:

[Thomas Stocker, co chair IPCC]
It is just not one decade that it is warmer. But a succession of multiple decades that provides us with a robust signal of a change in climate.

Although this is technically true, it is quite misleading. Yes, it is not just one decade (the temperature increase started somewhere in the 1980s and lasted until the end of the 1990s/start of 2000s), but the last decade the temperatures were completely flat. Of course, these decades followed each other (1980s increase, 1990s increase, 2000s flat). The misleading part of it is that the different decades didn’t have a steady increase. But that is what one would expect when hearing such a statement. There is a difference between “warm” and “getting warmer” that escaped attention. It fooled the VRT journalists, it certainly will fool many others too.

The polar ice was a clever diversion from the flat temperatures. Now the word was out that there was a standstill in temperatures, something else threatening had to be found:

[Thomas Stocker, co chair IPCC]
We are tasked to look at all aspects of climate change. Not only the warming, which is so evident to everybody, but more importantly changes in the water cycle and changes in sea level.

This put the focus away from temperatures and giving the impression that it is even worse than before. What temperature increase are we talking about in the long run?

(Translated from Dutch):

[Journalist]
According to the most conservative predictions, the end of this century will be on average 1.5 degrees warmer than 100 years ago. In the worst case the temperature rises by 2 degrees Celsius. And this has consequences.

That’s less than the minimum 2.0 °C that was projected in the previous report! So 1.5 °C is a step BACK, cleverly disguised as a step forward… This was brought as something significant. When the journalist would have compared the conclusions of this report with the previous one(s), he/she would find it a retreat from the previous position, not an advance.

Some images were recycled from the vicious circle story. We got the same images of someone working in dusty, dry soil and the shot of the two legs on a cracked soil. A pity they didn’t read the report, because they would have found out that not much is told about drought and with low confidence globally (likely in some regions), while it was implied as a fully-fledged part.

Then they switched to the Arctic ice, some scare stories could be found there (Translated from Dutch):

[Journalist]
For example, if we look at the surface Arctic ice in September, then the oldest predictions (in gray), have been overtaken by reality (the blue line). According to the latest forecasts (in light blue), there will be no ice in the summer by the end of this century. The last reports were sometimes criticized. Undeserved, says the IPCC. Our conclusions are confirmed.

Arctic Sea Ice extent

Arctic Sea Ice extent projection – AR4

Arctic Sea Ice extent - difference AR4 - AR5

Arctic Sea Ice extent projection – difference AR4 – AR5

First, look at the date of the minimum: 2012. They forgot that the minimum extent in September 2013 is already passed and it was considerably higher than 2012. It clocked at 5.1 million km2. That would make it about in the range of the minimum value. Now it is at 5.4 km2.

It is true that the Arctic ice is decreasing, but why only focus on the Arctic? Global sea ice doesn’t fluctuate that much because of the seesaw effect. What if the Arctic/Antarctic extent are cyclical events? Then the fall of Arctic sea ice would not be unusual, considering the seesaw effect together with the Antarctic ice extent.

Beside the last minimum date, the graphs that were shown are misleading. The predictions (they translated it that way in the graph) are in the gray area. But in reality there are many models that project ice extent. The original graph would have a maximum value, a minimum value and a median (probably this the representation of the gray area). The lowest value was below the minimum value, but not that much. By only giving a median value, the observations look much lower than when the maximum and minimum value were also drawn.

Plus, this is made on the assumption that the climate models of the Arctic area are correct.

I don’t know what they mean with the last reports are sometimes criticized and our conclusions are confirmed. Did they mean the Glaciergate blunder? They were indeed criticized for it and rightfully so. The IPCC stated in their previous report that the Himalayan glaciers would have melted by 2035. This was inserted into the report by a non scientific source (2 interviews). The sole purpose of insertion was putting political pressure on India.

Or does the journalist mean the conclusion: that Man is responsible for the warming? If so, it looks like it, but they chose to ignore the pause, the discrepancy between models/observations and climate cycles. Would their conclusion still stand when these issues were addressed head on? At least they would have to adjust their certainty DOWN in stead of up.

The IPCC obviously don’t want to give attention to the discrepancy between models and observations. That is not hard to understand. That would question the projections made in the report. Also a lot of climate policies start from the assumptions that the models are right, as well as financial and business schemes. They exactly knew there are issues that are not addressed in this report, but chose to ignore it.

From this, the journalists that didn’t check the story, brew something which made the message even stronger, even more convincing for the public, policy makers, entrepreneurs and activists alike. These are professionals that know how to bring a story and how to stir the emotions so the message will stick. In this case this was done by dramatic shots of calving ice, a farmer desperately preparing his dusty field, many fuming chimneys and the tailpipe of a car. The combination and succession of this all implied that “we are the culprit”.

There is a lot of momentum build into the system. We think this is all about a rational message, while it is in fact an emotional message that is being spread.